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CoRPORATioNs-SALE oF AssETs As A MEANs oF AvomING STATE CoN-
STITUTIONAL L!MrrATION ON CORPORATE LIFE-Defendant, a Michigan cor-
poration, was incorporated in 1923 for a term of thirty years, the maximum 
1954] RECENT DECISIONS 451 
term pennitted by the Michigan constitution.1 Shortly before this thirty-year 
term was to expire, majority and minority stockholders engaged in unsuccessful 
negotiations, each group attempting to purchase the other's interest in the 
corporation. A special stockholders' meeting was then called to consider a 
proposed renewal of the corporate term. This proposal failed to gamer the vote 
of two-thirds of the outstanding shares which was required for approval.2 The 
attorneys representing the majority shareholders proceeded to organize a dummy 
corporation, which in tum offered the entire issue of its corporate stock to 
defendant corporation in consideration for all of the assets of defendant cor-
poration. Defendant corporation, by a majority vote, accepted this offer.3 The 
newly acquired stock was distributed among the shareholders of defendant 
corporation, and thus the majority stockholders in effect caused defendant cor-
poration to extend its corporate life for another thirty-year term. A request by 
the minority shareholders for an injunction prohibiting the sale of the entire 
assets of defendant corporation was dismissed by the circuit court. On appeal, 
held, affirmed. The acts of defendant corporation were constitutional and 
sanctioned by the Michigan General Corporation Act. Porter 11. C.O. Porter 
Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W. (2d) 135 (1953). 
At common law, the general rule is that a single shareholder may restrain 
a sale of the entire assets of a corporation.4 Michigan and other states, have 
enacted statutes relaxing this common law requirement and providing that a 
prescribed portion of the stockholders may approve the sale of all or substantially 
all of the corporate assets.5 The purpose of these statutes is to prevent a small 
minority from forestalling corporate action which is desired by the overwhelming 
majority.6 However, it is doubtful that the Michigan legislature intended its 
statute to be used as a means of circumventing the Michigan constitution7 and 
provisions enacted pursuant to this constitution.8 The state supreme court 
rejected the argument that extension of corporate life by the sale of assets on the 
basis of majority approval is in contravention of the state constitution.9 The 
1 M:rcH. CoNST., art. XII, §3, states: "No corporation shall be created for a period 
longer than 30 years, • • • but the legislature may provide by general laws • . • for I or 
more extensions of the term of such corporations • • • on the consent of not less than % 
of the capital stock of the corporation •••• " 
2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.60 provides: "Any stock corporation whose term is 
about to expire by limitation, may • • • by the consent of the holders of at least % of its 
outstanding shares • • • direct the continuance of its corporate existence for such further 
term as permitted by law, as may be expressed in a resolution for that purpose." 
3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.57 provides: ''Every corporation ••• may sell ••• 
all or substantially all of its property and assets • • • for such consideration, which may 
be in whole or in part shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other corporation ••• 
as its board of directors shall deem expedient and for the best interests of the corporation, 
when and as authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares 
issued and outstanding .••• " 
4 6A FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §2947 (1950). 
5 Note 3 supra. 
6 BALLANTINB, CORPORATIONS 668 (1946). 
7 Note 1 supra. 
s Note 2 supra. 
9 Note I supra. 
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court described its decision as an interpretation of the constitution which adapts 
it to the necessities of a changing law. A more accurate description is that the 
court simply read the applicable provision out of the state constitution. The 
stockholders of defendant corporation are parties to a contract, the terms of 
which contain the Michigan constitution, 10 the renewal statute, 11 and the 
statute authorizing the sale of corporate assets on majority approval.12 When 
interpreting contract provisions, the courts are supposed to give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.13 Thus the question is whether the 
stockholders of defendant corporation contemplated approval of an extension 
of corporate life by a two-thirds or a majority vote of the outstanding shares. 
It seems most likely that the stockholders placed their emphasis on the con-
stitutional provision, and contemplated extending the corporate life only on 
the approval of two-thirds of the shareholders. As a practical result of the 
decision in the principal case, however, the majority stockholders are afforded 
a ready means of frustrating these contractual expectations by circumventing the 
constitutional requirement. It is difficult to discover a sound policy basis for 
the limitation imposed by the Michigan constitution; it would appear that the 
provision has lingered on from the days of general hostility toward the corporate 
form of business association. The lack of underlying policy may well be the 
motivation which caused the Michigan Supreme Court to strike this provision 
such a telling blow. 
Judson M. Werbelow 
10 Ibid. 
11 Note 2 supra. 
12Note 3 supra; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 
518 (1819). . 
131 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1 (1950); 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §538 (1950); Moulton 
v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 322 Mich. 307, 33 N.W. (2d) 804 (1948). 
